Microwave communications equipment most likely is present at installations belonging to all branches of the PLA.Chinese open sources report that the 2nd Artillery has a new digital microwave communications system to support its missile launches.The 2nd Artillery signal unit reportedly started developing the system around 1995 and it passed acceptance tests a few years later.This new system reportedly provides the 2nd Artillery with all weather and encrypted communication ability.
Cellular telephone service does not yet appear to be a significant element of PLA military communications,although China has shown interest in establishing dedicated military cellular systems for PLA use.However,with the explosive growth of cellular communications in the civilian sector,cellular communications could become a significant element of PLA communications in the future.To date,PLA involvement has been concerned primarily with commercial exploitation of cellular communications.
China’s military communications network continues to be upgraded; however,the bulk of China’s military communications reportedly is processed on communications lines run by the Ministry of Information Industry.Both networks are composed largely of commercial off-the-shelf technology.This technology either is not restricted for sale to China or recently was decontrolled,although Beijing probably has been successful in obtaining some restricted technology to modernize its telecommunications network.Europe,Japan and Israel compete to sell telecommunications technology,as well as related hardware and software,to China.
The PLA's Liberation Army Daily reported that Lanzhou MR military leaders made use of video teleconferencing during a fall 1997 command post exercise.The teleconferencing linked participants stationed at distant points throughout the MR.The newspaper also reported that China conducted its first operational level logistics support exercise using a computer network in late 1997.The exercise allegedly involved 150 computers and linked 22 separate divisions for the exercise.The eight-day exercise was described as taking place on an unprecedented scale,connecting units thousands of kilometers apart.
From China’s perspective,these international trends are creating an international environment that will "restrict" Beijing’s efforts to develop the hard and soft material,political,diplomatic,and economic components of national power.China believes that these trends indicate that it will be difficult for Beijing to develop a special relationship with Washington that would fundamentally moderate any US intent to "contain" China or that would encourage the United States to cooperate with China in offsetting Japan’s growing power.Moreover,China’s fundamental problem in responding to this negative security environment is that it has limited options in developing the international leverage necessary to offset US power in Eurasia.Since the 7 May 1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade,China’s leaders reportedly have been discussing ways to offset US power,to include accelerating military modernization,pursing strategic cooperation with Russia,and increasing China’s proliferation activities abroad.However,none of these options is likely to improve fundamentally Beijing’s position.